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We analyze the deficits of the German La¨nder for the period from 1960 to 2000
and test a number of hypotheses derived from the literature on the political economy
of public expenditures and public deficits. Estimating a dynamic panel data model,
we find evidence for political opportunism of the Rogoff/Sibert-type. German voters
seem to favor fiscal discipline as debt issue is significantly lower in pre-election years.
There is no evidence for partisan behavior. Party ideology thus plays a negligible
role. As suggested by the theory, coalition governments issue more debt. This effect
is, however, not statistically significant. If the probability of reelection is small, the
incumbent government may find it beneficial to issue more debt. We consider four
different approximations of the reelection probability but find evidence for none of
them.
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1 Introduction
Public deficits vary widely between jurisdictions. It is broadly accepted that economic
variables such as economic growth or the interest rate alone cannot explain these differ-
ences. In fact, political variables and political institutions play an important role in the
development of public debt (Persson and Tabellini (1997)). When comparing different
countries, however, one can hardly disentangle the effect of political variables and the im-
pact of political institutions. This identification problem disappears when the influence
of political variables on public debt in the German La¨nder is analyzed as the jurisdictions
have almost identical political institutions and electoral rules. Thus, our data set offers a
unique opportunity to solely test for the influence of political variables on public deficits.
We test a number of hypotheses taken from the theoretical literature on the political
economy of debt issue. Nordhaus (1975), for example, argues that a policy or a party
platform is designed in order to win the next election (political opportunism). If that
theory applies, expenditures - and consequently debt - should be expected to be higher in
the election year in order to ‘buy votes’. This theory was extended by Rogoff and Sibert
(1988) who suggest that debt should be lower in pre-election years. The government
thereby signals economic competence. Hibbs (1977) challenges the Nordhaus approach
and claims that a government’s policy is primarily driven by party ideology (partisan
theory). For the question addressed here, this simply means that left-wing parties are
expected to issue more debt than right-wing parties.
There is no consensus about whether opportunistic behavior plays a role. Nordhaus
(1975) finds evidence of this for two out of four elections in the US. Evidence for the UK
is completely lacking. Berger and Woitek (1997) find weak support for the opportunistic
school. However, they conclude that “[...] the evidence in favor of the Nordhaus approach
(is) not convincing” (Berger and Woitek (1997, p. 190)). Evidence for partisan politics is
mixed, too. Alesina (1989), Boix (2000), Cusack (1997) and Hibbs (1977), for example,
find support for the partisan theory, whereas Berger and Woitek (1997), Heckelman (2001)
and Seitz (2000), for instance, find no evidence for it.1
1Evidence for partsian politics is also scarce in non public finance fields. Duso (2002), for example,
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The theoretical models on both political opportunism and partisan politics typically
consider a two party system to analyze electoral competition. As a result, parties will
be in power during different time periods. With more than two parties, however, a
coalition government may arise. For different reasons, e.g., the war of attrition (Alesina
and Perotti (1994)) or the common pool problem (Persson and Tabellini (1997)), coalition
governments are expected to issue more debt than single-party governments. Again,
empirical evidence is not clear cut. Roubini and Sachs (1989) find support. Re-estimating
the Roubini and Sachs model, Edin and Ohlsson (1991) challenge their view and argue
that the coalition effect identified in Roubini and Sachs (1989) is a result of minority
governments rather than political cohesion. Finally, political instability may lead to
additional debt. In order to commit future government’s expenditures to debt service, the
incumbent may strategically increase debt issue (see, for instance, Alesina and Tabellini
(1987)).
We estimate a dynamic panel data model and find evidence for opportunistic behav-
ior of the Rogoff/Sibert type, i.e., debt issue is significantly lower in pre-election years.
Thus, German voters seem to favor fiscal discipline. We find that single-party Christian
Democratic governments were the most heavy users of this strategic tool. This is of par-
ticular interest since, overall, no partisan effects are detected. Our results for government
coalitions obey the ‘correct’ sign but, with a significance level of fourteen per cent, the
evidence is not overwhelming. A strategic deficit bias due to political instability may arise
when the probability of being thrown out of office is high. We use four approximations of
that probability and find no evidence for any of them.
The current paper is most related to Seitz (2000) who also analyzes the German La¨nder
deficits. We extend Seitz’s (2000) work along two lines. First, Seitz (2000) only addresses
the partisan approach whereas we test five hypotheses and thereby gain a number of new
insights. Second, in addition to the ordinary least squares estimator and the least squares
dummy variable estimator, we also provide the results of the Arellano-Bond estimator
(Arellano and Bond (1991)), a dynamic panel data estimator. This instrumental variable
showed that the government’s ideological position played only a minor role in explaining regulatory reform
in the mobile telecommunications industry in the OECD.
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estimator aims at correcting for the bias in the least squares dummy variable estimator
stemming from the dynamic structure of the model. This allows for robustness checks.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the institutional background for Ger-
many is provided. The hypotheses to be tested are derived in Section 3. We thereby
review the theoretical literature on the political economy of debt issue. In Section 4 we
describe the data set. The empirical model and the different estimators applied are intro-
duced in Section 5. The results are presented in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 offers some
concluding remarks.
2 Institutional background
2.1 Germany’s federal political design
The name “Federal Republic of Germany” (FRG) already highlights the country’s federal
structure that is reflected by the levels of government: federal (Bund), state (Land) and
local (Gemeinde). Since German unification in 1990 Germany has consisted of sixteen
La¨nder, the ten La¨nder of the former West Germany, the five new La¨nder of the former
East Germany (German Democratic Republic, GDR), and Berlin. From World War II
to unification, Berlin was divided into West Berlin and East Berlin, where the latter was
capital of the GDR. Additionally, there are about 14,000 cities and communities (Seitz
(2000, p. 188)).
The La¨nder are not mere provinces but states endowed with their own powers. These
powers and responsibilities are specified in the Basic Law (Grundgesetz), Germany’s con-
stitution. The Basic Law also guarantees the local authorities the right to independently
administer their own affairs. As the local authorities rely heavily on grants from the states,
their independence is rather limited. Three large German cities, namely, Berlin, Ham-
burg and Bremen, form their own states (La¨nder). These are the so-called “city-states”
(Stadtstaaten) that do not have local administrative bodies. In contrast, the other Ger-
man states are called “non-city-states” (Fla¨chenla¨nder). This distinction is important
since the budgets of the city-states include expenditures and revenues that are part of the
local budgets in non-city-states. Moreover, the expenditures of the non-city-states include
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grants to the local authorities whereas there are no such grants to local authorities in the
city-states. Consequently, public expenditures or public debt of the two types of state are
not directly comparable.2
Our study examines the budget deficits of the La¨nder without taking the local author-
ities into account. As mentioned above, local authorities have their own budgets and their
own parliaments. Election dates typically differ between local and state jurisdictions. As
a consequence, the aggregated local political structure will hardly ever match the political
structure of the Land. This is why we concentrate on the public deficits of the states and
neglect those that may arise at the local level.
2.2 Fiscal federalism in Germany
Although the La¨nder are endowed with their own powers, an almost total lack of tax set-
ting autonomy exists. Additionally, a large fiscal equalization system harmonizes revenues
across states, calculated on the basis of several fiscal and economic indicators, and this
strongly distorts incentives to increase the tax base. The situation in Germany, therefore,
differs in one major aspect from the theoretical literature on the political economy of
public expenditures: typically the government has two options for financing expenditures
– taxes and debt. But, due to the lack of tax setting autonomy and the equalization
scheme, total revenue of every Land is more or less fixed (for a more detailed overview
see Seitz (2000, pp. 188-190)). To finance public expenditures, La¨nder governments only
have one discretionary source of financing at their disposal, namely debt. Since other rev-
enues can be considered exogenous, we concentrate on public deficits and their political
determinants.
In addition to these peculiarities of German fiscal federalism, there are two more
important aspects. First, in 1990, East Germany joined the FRG, enlarging the population
from around 64 millions to roughly 80 millions, while GDP only increased by less than
10 per cent. The integration of East Germany into the West German social security
system, the huge investments in infrastructure and various other costs of transformation
2In our empirical model, the state fixed effects account for that fundamental difference.
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created a substantial fiscal shock. Although during the first five years after unification
most of the direct financial burden was borne by the federal government via a so-called
unification fund (Fonds Deutsche Einheit), we control for unification by introducing a
unification dummy, UNIFIC, from 1991 onwards (unification was in the fourth quarter
of 1990). Secondly, from 1995 onwards, the new German La¨nder, i.e. the former East
Germany, were included in the fiscal equalization system. A large part of this equalization
is between the La¨nder (horizontal equalization). As the new La¨nder were net recipients,
this introduced a fiscal burden on the Western La¨nder. We account for that by introducing
an equalization dummy, EQUAL, that assumes the value one from 1995 onwards.
2.3 Political parties
In Germany, there are four major parties. The Christian Democratic Union (CDU),
the Social Democratic Party (SPD), the Free Democratic Party (FDP) and the Green
party (GREEN). While CDU, SPD and FDP ran for elections in the entire period under
study here, the Greens did not. The Green party was founded in 1980 and first won
parliamentary seats at the state level in Hamburg and Hesse in 1982 and at the federal
level in 1983. Due to historical developments after World War II, the CDU has never
run for elections in Bavaria. Instead their so-called sister party, the Christian Social
Union (CSU), participates. However, the programmes of CDU and CSU are very similar
and they always form one parliamentary group in the federal parliament (Bundestag).
Therefore, we do not distinguish between them and label both CDU.
At the end of the 1980s a far right wing party, the Republicans, managed to gain some
seats in several La¨nder parliaments but have never been part of a government. After
unification, the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) was founded, a successor to the
United Socialist Party (SED), the party that ruled East Germany for more than 40 years.
Although the PDS has a significant influence in the new La¨nder, it has not succeeded
in gaining any influence in the Western La¨nder.3 As the democratic history of the East
German La¨nder is rather short, we abstain from including them into our analysis. Due to
3To some extent, Berlin is an exception as the PDS currently forms a coalition with the SPD. Note,
however, that today’s Berlin is not a former Western Land.
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its special status, Berlin is also eliminated from the data set (see below for more details).
Within the last forty years, the West German La¨nder were either governed by majority
governments of the CDU or the SPD or by a coalition that mostly consisted of two
parties. The SPD has formed coalitions with all three other parties, whereas the CDU has
only formed coalitions with the SPD (a so-called ‘grand coalition’) or the FDP. Minority
governments as well as other government constellations have played a negligible role. Table
2 in the Appendix provides, among other things, an overview of government formations
in the West German states.4
3 The political economy of public deficits
There is a large number of conflicting theories explaining the formation and the evolu-
tion of public deficits. In this section we review the literature and derive the respective
hypotheses to be tested in Section 6. Our focus is on four theories, namely, political
opportunism, partisan theory, divided governments, and political instability.5
3.1 Political opportunism
Opportunistic governments are assumed to be primarily interested in being reelected.
There are no ideological motives. Thus, parties “[...] do not care about the effects of
their policies on the economy except insofar as they influence voters’ electoral choices”
(Alesina (1987, p. 651)). In a two-party system, both competing parties will adopt the
same platform and implement the same policies once elected, thereby maximizing their
chance of being (re-)elected.
The theory of political opportunism was introduced in the context of the ‘Phillips
curve’ (see Nordhaus (1975) and MacRae (1977)). Among others, Alesina and Perotti
(1994) and Persson and Tabellini (1997) demonstrated that this theory can also be ap-
plied to public deficits: to appear competent to voters, the incumbent government has
4For an explanation of the variables see Table 1 in the Appendix.
5In their paper on the political economy of state aid in the European Community, Neven and Ro¨ller
(2000) also review the political theories of government.
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an incentive to boost the economy prior to elections thereby improving the chances of
being reelected, or, more generally, the incumbent government is prepared to introduce
distorted policies in order to increase the chance of being reelected. Such policies mostly
require raising transfers or increasing public investments, e.g., investments in public in-
frastructure, housing, or hospitals. As German La¨nder are hardly able to influence their
returns, the augmented public expenditure will result in (further) debt, especially in elec-
tion years.6
Hypothesis 1 Public deficits are higher in election years.
For such a policy to be successful, assumptions about expectations or information have
to be made. Of course, irrational voters will not (fully) anticipate that the debt burden
has to be borne after the election. However, opportunistic cycles also obtain with ratio-
nal expectations when there is a fraction of uniformed voters who cannot correctly link
economic performance to public debt. Rogoff and Sibert (1988) developed a model based
on rational expectations where electoral cycles originate in (temporary) informational
asymmetries. Prior to election, the incumbent government tries to exploit its information
advantage. By issuing less debt it can signal that it is doing well. Low debt demonstrates
that the government can efficiently provide a given level of public goods. Since deficits
are visible to voters with a time lag, the incumbent runs a smaller deficit in the year prior
to election. Electoral competition is, thus, asymmetric as the potential entrant has no
such credible tool to signal fiscal competence.
Hypothesis 2 Public deficits are lower in pre-election years.
Consider that a government can be sure of being reelected. For the German case,
Bavaria serves as an example, where the CSU has been in office since the 1950s. As
there is basically no risk of being thrown out of office, there is no incentive to introduce
distorted policies. Thus, finding no evidence for political opportunism may simply reflect
political stability (see Hypothesis 5).
6One may argue that there is a time lag between expenditures and growth so that a higher deficit in
pre-election years results. This argument will be tested in the context of Hypothesis 2
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3.2 Partisan theory
In his seminal paper, Hibbs (1977) analyzed unemployment and inflation in twelve western
economies. He found clear evidence for the negative correlation between unemployment
and inflation as suggested by the ‘Phillips curve’. More importantly, he demonstrated
that countries with conservative (right) parties in executive face low inflation but high
unemployment and countries with socialist or labor (left) parties in executive face high
inflation and low unemployment. Hibbs concludes that policies of the executive are driven
by the governing party’s ideology.
To be more general, the partisan theory predicts a more expansionary policy for left
governments than for right governments. For the German La¨nder deficits, this simply
means that left governments are expected to issue more public debt than right govern-
ments. Left governments typically are more inclined to run redistributive policies. Public
spending may therefore be directed towards mitigating income inequality by increasing
transfers. Such programmes may require debt issue. Note, however, that debt in itself in-
volves redistribution as income taxation is typically progressive. The debt burden mainly
falls on high incomes. Considering the ideological differences to be time invariant we can
state the next hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3 Left governments issue more debt than right governments generating a
partisan trend or cycle.
It may be a bit naive to claim that parties only follow their ideological preferences and
do not care about winning the next election. Therefore, consider a two party system where
both the right and the left parties care about winning elections. In electoral competition
both parties will adopt the same platform (the one that maximizes the probability of
being elected) if they are equally well informed about the preferences of the electorate.
Once elected, each party will implement its most favored policy if it is not committed to
its platform. Irrational voters will not anticipate the parties’ incentives to deviate from
their announced policy. Whether the left policy or the right policy is implemented is thus,
in this framework, simply a matter of chance.
Alesina (1987, 1988) introduced rational expectations into the partisan theory and
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showed that there may be a rational partisan cycle: consider electoral competition to be
a one shot game. Again, parties will announce converging platforms in order to maximize
the probability of winning the election. Rational voters, though, anticipate the parties’
incentives to deviate from their platform and they evaluate party programmes rather
than party platforms. The policy implemented will, in general, be determined by party
programmes (and the preferences of the electorate). Additionally, Alesina (1988) showed
that policy convergence may obtain when electoral competition is modelled as an infinitely
repeated game. Convergence breaks down if the discount factor of at least one party is
sufficiently low, i.e., if reputation is of minor importance.
To summarize, following Alesina (1988) the assumption of time invariant ideological
differences is equivalent to modelling electoral competition as a one shot game or as an
infinitely repeated game with a sufficiently low discount factor. Thus, if no partisan trends
are found, this may be (i) due to the non-existence of partisan behavior or (ii) due to
strong reputational effects that lead to an adaptation of party policies.
3.3 Divided governments
The theories discussed so far modelled electoral competition between two parties that
simultaneously aim at political power. With only two parties, there is no conflict once
one party is elected. With more than two parties, coalition governments may arise, thus
opening up another stage of conflict.
Persson and Tabellini (1997, pp. 68-71) provide a simple model of debt issue incentives
in coalitions: consider a two party system with two respective interest groups, two periods
and no elections. There is a budget constraint in each period and every partner of the
coalition is willing to allocate as much as possible of the budget to its constituency. Each
party proposes a spending level for their group. If proposals are feasible, i.e., if expenditure
levels fulfill the budget constraint, the allocation follows the proposals. Otherwise each
group receives a share proportional to the proposal of their party. In period 2 both
parties will propose spending the entire budget (for their interest group) and a symmetric
equilibrium with identical expenditures results. The situation in period 1 is different in the
sense that debt issue reduces period 2 resources. But since the future budget is shared
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equally, the costs of further debt are not fully internalized, leading to the well known
common pool problem. Too high spending proposals result, leading to an inefficiently
high issue of debt. Since the fraction of internalized costs decreases in coalition size, the
severity of the problem is larger, the more parties forming the coalition.
Hypothesis 4 Coalition governments (a) issue more debt and (b) debt increases in coali-
tion size.
An obvious criticism of the Persson/Tabellini argument is that both parties have
control over some part of the budget and none of the parties is responsible for the entire
budget. Centralization of financial responsibility would yield efficiency.
Another theory that explains higher deficits for coalition governments is offered by
Alesina and Perotti (1994, pp. 22-29): consider a permanent fiscal shock. Coalition
partners will then fight about the allocation of the fiscal burden to the respective con-
stituencies. This situation is well modelled by the ‘war of attrition’. In general, delayed
adjustment to the fiscal shock will obtain, allowing debt to accumulate.
Hallerberg and von Hagen (1996) find that countries with majoritarian electoral sys-
tems are more likely to have single-party governments and countries with proportional
electoral systems are more likely to have coalition governments. Thus, the question of
whether coalition governments have different incentives to issue debt than single-party
governments is of some importance for the design of the electoral system. So, if we find
evidence for Hypothesis 4, a switch to a majoritarian electoral system may contribute to
fiscal stabilization.
3.4 Political instability
The stock of debt links past policies to future policies (Alesina and Perotti, (1994, p. 16)).
So, if the incumbent cannot directly commit the succeeding government to certain policies,
it can do so indirectly by strategic issue of debt. It thereby obliges future expenditures
to debt service. This strategic deficit bias is more important, the more often governments
turnover (Alesina and Tabellini (1987); Tabellini and Alesina (1990)).
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But, even without this particular bias, political instability may have an impact on
debt: the incumbent government fully internalizes the benefits of additional borrowing
but, as the costs of further debt issue only accrue when it is reelected, the incumbent
government does not take full account of the negative impact of future increases in debt
service. This inefficiency increases the more unlikely the government’s reelection (Persson
and Tabellini (1997, pp. 61-68)). Both arguments can well be summarized as our final
hypothesis.
Hypothesis 5 The larger the probability of being thrown out of office, the higher the
public deficit in election years.
4 Data
The data set comprises yearly data for 10 West German La¨nder from 1960 to 2000. In
the early years of the FRG, i.e. before 1960, the party structure was relatively unstable.
Several small regional parties joined state governments for short periods and disappeared
afterwards. Additionally, different coalitions governed within one election period. As
this was clearly just a post-war phenomenon, we do not include these years into our
analysis. Data for the Saarland is only available from 1960 onwards because its economic
reintegration into the Federal Republic of Germany was in July 1959. As this prevents
us from calculating growth rates for 1960, we arrive at an unbalanced panel with 409
observations. As already mentioned above, Berlin and the five new German La¨nder have
not been selected into our sample. Berlin is excluded for two reasons. First, Berlin was
divided before 1990. While East Berlin was the capital of the GDR, West Berlin was part
of the FRG. Second, West Berlin received generous grants from the federal government,
making debt issue more or less unnecessary. From 1990 onwards, data for the East German
La¨nder are available. We nevertheless do not select them, as the period is simply too short
to obtain sufficient (political) variation.
Deficit data are taken from Statistisches Bundesamt (Federal Statistical Office, 2001).
Data for the gross domestic product (GDP) and GDP per capita have been provided by
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the Statistical Office of Baden Wu¨rttemberg and the Federal Statistical Office.7 Nominal
numbers were deflated by the consumer price index for all households obtained from
Statistisches Bundesamt (2003).8 The election dates as well as the election results in
both percentage of votes and numbers of seats were taken from the Forschungsgruppe
Wahlen (2000, Election Research Team).
5 The empirical model
In recent studies of public deficits or public expenditures the variable of interest has
typically been transformed before running regressions. Cusack (1997) and Seitz (2000),
for example, take its first difference as a share of GDP. This is basically done in order to
obtain stationary time series. We consider growth rates for the same purpose. The major
advantage of our approach is that GDP is not used in the construction of the dependent
variable which could otherwise be a source of endogeneity. We consider the following
dynamic panel data model






zit + µi + ǫit,
where dit denotes the growth rate of public debt in state i = 1, ..., N at time t = 1, ..., T and
di,t−1 its first lag, t = 2, ..., T . GDP growth rate is denoted yit and the political variables
are summarized in the vector xit. This vector changes according to the hypothesis under
study. In contrast, the control variables, zit, are independent of the hypothesis. We
control for the first and second oil crisis (OIL1, OIL2) as well as for German unification
(UNIFIC) and for the inclusion of the East German La¨nder into the fiscal equalization
scheme (EQUAL).9 Finally, debt issue may respond to the financial costs of borrowing,
namely, the interest rate (INTRATE). Note that the interest rate varies over time but
not over states. The variable can therefore only explain within state variation and not
between state variation.
7We thank Alexandra Gu¨nther and Walter Becker from the respective institutes.
8Average real GDP growth is around 3 per cent and average real debt growth is around 6 per cent.
9Definition of all variables can be found in the Appendix in Table 1.
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The time invariant state effect is given by µi. We will consider these effects as fixed
rather than random. It can be argued that there is no room for random effects as the
entire population, i.e., all ten West German La¨nder, are included in the study. In fact,
the Hausman test rejects the random effects specification, the random effects estimator
would be biased due to the endogeneity of µi. This may not be too surprising as Bavaria,
for example, was ruled by the CSU during the entire period considered here. North-
Rhine Westfalia is an example of a long lasting SPD government. Obviously we will







it), then the assumptions of the model can be summarized as follows
E(ǫitǫjs) = 0 for i 6= j or t 6= s
E(µiǫjt) = 0 for all i, j, t(2)
E(witǫjs) = 0 for all i, j, s, t.
As is well known, the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator is inconsistent when
a dynamic panel data model, like the one in equation (1), is to be estimated. The
explanatory variable di,t−1 is positively correlated with the time invariant state effect µi
and this correlation does not vanish with either increasing N or with increasing T (see,
e.g., Bond (2000, p. 4)). The estimates of γ will be biased upwards and the coefficients
of the exogenous variables will be biased towards zero (see Hsiao (1986, pp. 76-78)). The
fixed effects estimator (or Least-Squares Dummy Variable estimator, LSDV estimator)
eliminates this source of inconsistency by wiping out the La¨nder fixed effects µi. There
nevertheless remains a bias, as the lagged endogeneous variable is correlated with the
transformed error term. Nickell (1981) showed that the fixed effects estimator for γ may
be seriously biased downwards in short panels. However, he also showed that the bias
approaches zero as T tends to infinity. Since T is relatively large in our study (T = 41), the
bias is likely to be moderate. As simulation studies have shown, the bias in the estimates
for the coefficients of the exogenous variables, here α1 and α2, tend to be positive but are
much smaller relative to those of γ (see, for example, Judson and Owen (1997, Tables 2
and 3)). As we are primarily interested in an estimate of α1, applying the LSDV estimator
is appropriate. This is well in line with the recommendations given in Judson and Owen
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(1999).10
Arellano and Bond (1991) consider the first difference version of the model described
in equation (1),







where ∆ is the first difference operator, e.g., ∆dit = dit−di,t−1. Note that this transforma-
tion eliminates the (time invariant) fixed effects. OLS still yields biased estimates as the
error term is, as before, correlated with the lagged difference of the dependent variable.
The generalized method of moments estimator of Arellano and Bond (1991), henceforth
GMM estimator, uses all valid lagged dependent variables (in levels) as instruments for
∆dit. The GMM estimator is consistent and asymptotically efficient (when N tends to
infinity). We consider the regressors summarized in wit as strictly exogenous so that
variables themselves and all their lags are valid instruments.11
We consider the homoscedastic (one-step) version of the GMM estimator. The two-
step version, that allows for heteroscedasticity, may improve efficiency. Simulation studies
have shown, however, that the two-step GMM is - in most cases - less efficient than the
one-step GMM, i.e. the two-step GMM yields higher standard errors (see, e.g., Arellano
and Bond (1991), Kiviet (1995), and Judson and Owen (1997)). We therefore concentrate
on the one-step version. Additionally, Judson and Owen (1997) have shown that there is
a tradeoff when increasing the number of lags used as instruments in the GMM estimator
(see their Tables 2, 3 and 4): increasing the number of instruments improves efficiency
but also increases the bias. To account for that tradeoff, we set the maximum number of
lags to be used as instruments to 5.
In principle, efficiency gains may be achievable when applying the systems estimator
10Actually Judson and Owen (1999) recommend using the biased corrected LSDV estimator developed
by Kiviet (1995). Apart from the fact that this procedure requires a balanced panel, the approximation
formula is derived considering a random effects specification. Our unbalanced panel with state fixed
effects thus for two reasons prevents us from using this procedure.
11Note that the GMM estimator takes first order autocorrelation of ∆ǫ into account. Thus, neither
consistency nor efficiency is affected by first order autocorrelation. However, second order correlation
implies inconsistency (Arellano and Bond (1991, pp. 281-282)).
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of Blundell and Bond (1998). But, as both the Arellano-Bond estimator and the Blundell-
Bond estimator are micro panel data estimators, they have poor finite sample properties
when N is small. As N is small in our study (N = 10), results of both estimators should
mainly be seen as a robustness checks for the results of the more reliable (and more
efficient) LSDV estimator. To check for robustness, we only provide the estimates of the
Arellano-Bond estimator, labelled as GMM. As already mentioned above, OLS produces
a positive bias for γ and a negative for α1 and α2. This is the other way round for the
LSDV estimator. Thus, if GMM is more efficient, then we should expect the estimates to
lie between the OLS and LSDV estimates for all parameters to be estimated.
6 Results
Before testing the political economy of debt issue, we briefly discuss results with economic
indicators and some controls only. The regression results are shown in Table 3 in the
Appendix. With a coefficient of around .3, debt dynamics are relatively moderate. The
impact of GDP growth is significantly negative as expected. A downturn in the economy
drives up public deficits. This may be due to expenditure programmes, reduced tax
revenues, or both. Neither the effect of the lagged debt growth, DEFICIT(-1), nor the
effect of economic growth, GDP, is of particular interest for this study. To save space we
therefore do not report the coefficients of these variables when testing for the political
variables. For the same reason, we refrain from reporting the coefficient estimates of the
control variables for these regressions.
Both the first and second oil crises, OIL1 and OIL2, respectively, increased debt
growth, though, the effect of the latter is statistically insignificant. German unification
in 1990 had a significant negative impact on debt growth. This is somewhat surprising
as unification introduced a substantial fiscal burden on former West Germany. Most
of the financial burden of unification was borne by the social security systems and the
German unification fund. Moreover, the economy boomed right after unification and this
increased tax revenues. This may explain why no further state debt was needed. We find
no significant effect of the inclusion of the East German La¨nder into the fiscal equalization
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system (EQUAL) on public debt growth. The results reported here are more or less the
same for all estimates discussed below.
Comparing the OLS and LSDV estimates gives valuable insights. As already men-
tioned in the previous section, OLS overestimates γ and underestimates α1 and α2. For
LSDV it is the other way round. The true value can thus be expected to lie between the
OLS and LSDV estimates. Since the estimates of coefficients do not differ very much,
we get a fairly good prediction about the true coefficients. The bias in the LSDV esti-
mator seems to be negligible - especially for the exogenous variables. In contrast, GMM
produces rather unreliable results. There may be two reasons: first, the GMM estimator
is a micro-panel data estimator and therefore has poor finite sample properties when N
is small. Second, consistency of GMM breaks down if second order autocorrelation in
residuals is detected. As N is small in our study and since the hypothesis of no auto-
correlation can never be rejected at the 5 per cent level, we concentrate on the LSDV
estimator throughout.
6.1 Political opportunism (Hypothesis 1 and 2)
In Subsection 3.1 we presented two versions of political opportunism. The standard ver-
sion of Nordhaus (1975) and MacRae (1977) predicted higher deficits for election years
as the incumbent government tries to buy votes, e.g., by increasing transfers to targeted
voters or by boosting the economy in general (Hypothesis 1). This theory, however,
breaks down when rational expectations are considered. Introducing rational expecta-
tions, Rogoff and Sibert (1988) demonstrated that political opportunism implies lower
deficits in pre-election years (Hypothesis 2). The incumbent thereby demonstrates its
fiscal competence.
Before we test the hypothesis let us first take a brief look at the descriptive statistics.
The average debt growth rate calculated over all years and all states is 6.5 per cent.
For election years, we find a growth rate of as much as 7.3 per cent and for pre-election
years 4.6 per cent. These numbers suggest that both hypotheses may hold. To test for
these hypotheses, we include two dummy variables in our regression: ELECTION and
PREELEC. The first variable equals 1 in election years and zero otherwise, the second
16
accordingly for pre-election years. Table 3 reveals that debt growth is, indeed, significantly
lower in pre-election years whereas no significant effect is detected for election years.
But note that the coefficient for election years nevertheless has the correct sign.12 We
thus reject Hypothesis 1 and confirm Hypothesis 2. Although results do not allow us to
discriminate between rational and non-rational expectations, we conclude that German
voters seem to be in favor of fiscal discipline.
One might ask whether the strategic lower debt issue in pre-election years is used
equally across parties or whether there are some government constellations that make more
use of this tool than others. The descriptive statistics, shown in Table 2, demonstrate that
Social Democratic governments tend to issue less debt. Single-party SPD governments
with 4.1 per cent debt growth in pre-election years, SPD/FDP coalitions with 3.5 per cent,
and SPD/GREEN coalitions with 3.0 per cent are clearly below the average of 4.6 per
cent. SPD/CDU coalitions, though, are an exception to this pattern. At this stage, one
should be cautious in interpreting the results. First, it is not perfectly clear what we are
actually measuring when we interact different types of governments with the pre-election
year. Partisan effects, to be tested in the next subsection, may well come into play and
so too may coalition effects that will also be tested below. Second, there are very few
observations for pre-election years for some government constellations. Taking a closer
look at the data reveals that 2 out of 6 observations for SPD/CDU coalitions are clearly
outliers. Debt growth in Lower Saxony was 17 per cent in 1966 and 24 per cent in 1967
for Baden-Wu¨rttemberg.
We investigate the strategic use of lower government debt in pre-election years by mak-
ing the pre-election dummy interact with all possible party constellations. The regression
results reveal that CDU single-party governments seem to use this tool most heavily. This
contrasts strongly with the descriptive statistics discussed above and demonstrates that it
may be misleading to analyze descriptive statistics only. The means presented in Table 2
are calculated over time and states. As political majorities are highly correlated with the
states, the means measure to a considerable extent La¨nder (fixed) effects. As the LSDV
12We ran two separate regressions. Results do not change by much when including both dummies in a
single regression.
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estimator is calculated on within-state variation only, the coefficients do not suffer from
this endogeneity bias. We conclude that there is strategic lower debt issue by parties in
pre-election years and that the CDU tends to use this tool more aggressively than other
parties do.
6.2 Partisan theory (Hypothesis 3)
Left governments are usually more inclined to redistribute income. As additional debt
issue enables the government to, for instance, increase transfers to the poor, the partisan
theory predicts higher debt issue for left governments. To check whether fiscal policy
is driven by party ideology, we have to assign every government constellation to either
left or right. We categorize SPD governments, SPD/FDP coalitions and SPD/GREEN
coalitions as left. CDU governments and CDU/FDP coalitions are labelled right. It is
difficult to ascribe a political orientation to SPD/CDU governments. There are basically
two alternatives. First, do not label such coalitions and use them as a reference category
in the estimation. Second, use the party affiliation of the prime minister to allocate a
label. We opted for the second alternative as only 20 years of SPD/CDU government out
of 410 years are simply too few observations for a sensible reference category.13 A similar
reasoning applies to all other government constellations summarized in ELSE (10 of 410
years). These government constellations are considered left when the Social Democrats
were involved and right when the Christian Democrats were.
Before we interpret estimation results let us again first take a look at the descriptive
statistics. Table 2 identifies right governments as the ones issuing more debt. As the
difference in debt growth rates between right governments (6.7 per cent) and left govern-
ments (6.3 per cent) is rather low, a significant partisan effect in the data would be a
surprise. And, indeed, a significance level of 44 per cent is far beyond any conventional
level. Note, however, that the coefficient obeys the correct sign, i.e., left governments
tend to issue more debt (right governments are reference category).
One may argue that this simple right-left scale is imprecise and does not map the
13Results are independent of the alternative adopted.
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differences in government constellations properly. We therefore also analyze debt issue by
different governments. The descriptive statistics offer one, at a first sight, surprising result:
SPD/GREEN coalitions issue the least debt of all possible government constellations.
This may, in fact, be true but it may also be a simple time effect. While all other
government constellations occurred in more or less every period, this was not the case for
coalitions of the Social Democrats with the Greens. 31 of 32 years of red/green government
occurred after 1990, a period with clearly lower debt growth rates than before. Our
dynamic empirical model accounts for this as the constant induces a linear time trend in
growth rates.
For the estimation of government effects (see Table 3) we consider CDU single-party
governments as the reference category. For the OLS and LSDV estimates, we find that all
other governments tend to issue more debt than CDU governments though none of the
effects is statistically significant.
To summarize, Hypothesis 3 cannot be confirmed.14 Nevertheless, interpretation of
this result remains difficult (see also Subsection 3.2). It may well be that there are no
partisan trends in German La¨nder politics – that ideology plays a negligible role. This
is, however, not necessarily true. Once the parties care not only about ideology but
also about winning the next election, platform convergence will occur. Since elections
can well be considered a repeated game, parties will stick to their platforms. Otherwise
they risk their reputation: identifying the opponent as a liar is a powerful weapon in
electoral competition. If reputation is decisive, then platform convergence implies policy
convergence and with it adaptation of fiscal policies. Differences can hardly be detected.
And indeed, for Germany, it is usually argued that both major parties, SPD and CDU,
are close to the center.
Although no partisan effects are found, conventional wisdom in Germany is that the
CDU is more concerned about fiscal discipline and fiscal stability than the Social De-
mocrats. The CDU is claimed to be simply more competent in fiscal policy. Our result
for political opportunism offers a new explanation: leaving La¨nder effects aside, the CDU
makes more use of lower debt issue in pre-election years to signal fiscal competence than
14This is well in line with the findings of Seitz (2000).
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other parties do. In fact, this may have played a major role in their electoral campaign.15
6.3 Divided governments (Hypothesis 4)
There are several reasons for expecting higher deficits with coalition governments, e.g.,
as argued in Subsection 3.3, the common pool problem or the war of attrition. 206 years
of coalition governments yield an average debt growth of 6.3 per cent compared to 6.5
per cent for the 203 single-party governments. The descriptives, thus, raise doubts about
Hypothesis 4.
From our discussion on the results of political opportunism we know that one should
be cautious when interpreting cross state averages. We therefore define the indicator
variable COAL that assumes a value of one whenever two or more parties formed the
government and zero otherwise. All estimates are in line with the hypothesis though
significance levels of 9 per cent (OLS) and 14 per cent (LSDV) provide no overwhelming
evidence.
Severity of the common pool problem increases in the size of the population exploiting
an exhaustable resource. For our purposes, this simply means that debt issue incentives
are the higher the more parties in the coalition. The number of parties in a coalition
is summarized in COALSIZE. Its effect on debt growth, however, is insignificant. This
does not necessarily prove that part (b) of the hypothesis is wrong. Since only 13 of 206
coalition years have more than two parties, and, all have had three parties, we cannot
expect to find anything significant.
Before we turn to the analysis of political instability, let us briefly review the results
obtained so far. We found support for political opportunism of the Rogoff and Sibert
type, namely, lower debt growth in pre-election years. We also claimed that the CDU
makes more use of this strategic tool than all other governments do. The following
subsections on partisan theory and divided governments demonstrated that the “pre-
election-CDU-effect” is not an artifact of partisan trends or special coalition incentives
as neither Hypothesis 3 nor Hypothesis 4 was confirmed. One might argue that there
15This result survives when testing for pre-election effect on a left-right scale.
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is some (weak) evidence that coalitions issue more debt than single-party governments.
If this is true, then debt issue incentives of SPD single-party governments would be an
appropriate benchmark. As the coefficient of the CDU/pre-election interaction is roughly
50 per cent higher than that of the SPD, our interpretation still remains valid.
6.4 Political instability (Hypothesis 5)
Finally, Hypothesis 5 suggests that the deficit a government runs is negatively correlated
with the probability of being reelected. By issuing further debt the incumbent government
can commit the future government’s expenditures to debt service and can thereby, at least
to some extent, prevent policies that would mainly favor the opponent’s constituency from
being implemented. This effect can only occur in election years for two reasons. First,
the time lag from the day the budget was passed to the next election is simply too large
for all other years. Second, reliable polling data two years prior to an election are simply
not available. But consider, although unlikely, data were available. The deficit might
then also be higher in pre-election years. From our analysis of political opportunism,
however, we know that governments use pre-election deficits to signal fiscal competence.
So trying to bind the future government’s hands in pre-election years undermines exactly
that signal. We therefore concentrate on election years.
Another fundamental question is how to approximate the probability of being thrown
out of office. Maybe the best what could be done is construct a measure using polling
data. But such data are, unfortunately, not available. There are many strategies for
solving that problem and we present four of them.
Assumption 1 The higher the current majority of the incumbent government, the lower
the probability of being thrown out of office. A large current majority then goes along with
low debt issue in the election year.
The variable ASSUMP1 is constructed by lagging the government majority in the
election year. This prevents that the government in the election year is the new one
already, which would be the case if the inaugural date were before July 1. We find no
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support for the hypothesis with Assumption 1. This may not be too surprising as the
current majority is a rather poor predictor for the outcome of the next election.
One may argue that grand coalitions, i.e. those between SPD and CDU, are outliers.
As they often have votes of more than 80 per cent this is, in fact, what they are. To
neglect grand coalitions not only seems to make sense from an econometric perspective
but also from a political one. Why, and how, should a grand coalition issue more debt,
when one at least of the two parties will be in government next period? Therefore, we set
ASSUMP1 to missing for grand coalitions and rerun regressions. Results do not change.
As with the strategic issue of less debt in pre-election years, some parties may make
more use of the commitment strategy of Hypothesis 5 than others. Interacting ASSUMP1
with party or coalition dummies yields no significant effects.
Assumption 2 Consider that the incumbent government correctly anticipates the out-
come of the upcoming elections in terms of votes. This is equivalent to assuming that
perfectly reliable polling data were available (in the pre-election year at the time the elec-
tion year’s budget is set up). Then debt issue will be larger, the smaller the number of
votes for the incumbent.
The variable ASSUMP2 is obtained by lagging the pre-election year government in
the election year and combining this information with the votes gained in the election.
Again, independent of whether grand coalitions are included or excluded, evidence for
Hypothesis 5 is lacking. Party effects also play no role.
Assumption 3 Consider the incumbent government correctly anticipates that elections
will be close, or that the competing party or block will be ahead in terms of votes, then the
government may issue more debt as the likelihood of being reelected is small. Debt issue
will be larger the further the competing block is ahead of the current government.
We consider two blocks. The CDU forms one block and the SPD together with the
Greens the other block. Putting the Social Democrats and the Greens together is ob-
vious as, in all cases, the Greens were in government they formed a coalition with the
Social Democrats. The FDP is much more flexible. 18 per cent of all governments were
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SPD/FDP coalitions and 18 per cent were CDU/FDP coalitions. It is thus impossible to
allocate the Liberals to one particular block.
The variable ASSUMP3 is calculated as the votes for the CDU in the upcoming elec-
tions minus the sum of votes for SPD and Greens when there is a government with SPD
participation and the other way round for CDU government participation. No significant
effect is observed.
Assumption 4 Consider the incumbent government correctly anticipates a change of
government, then it will issue more debt in the year of change.
We set the change variable ASSUMP4 to 1 if government participation of both major
parties, i.e. SPD and CDU, changes. A change from, or to, a grand coalition is, thus,
never considered a change. There are 11 of these major changes and debt growth in these
years is, with 8.1 per cent, considerably higher than in years with no major change of
government (6.5 per cent). This result is to some extent mirrored in our estimation results.
The coefficient always obeys the correct positive sign. Moreover, the GMM estimate yields
significance at the 10 per cent level. Hence, we find some evidence of strategic debt issue
when a major change is correctly anticipated.
It is tempting to check whether SPD or CDU governments tend to use this tool more
aggressively. We therefore interact the variable ASSUMP4 with SPD and CDU. CDU
governments, correctly anticipating that they will be thrown out of office, produce, on
average, 9.7 per cent debt growth in the year of change (6 cases), whereas the SPD only
produces 6.1 per cent (5 cases), which is well below the overall average of 6.5 per cent.
For two reasons, these results should be interpreted very cautiously. First, there were
only 11 cases and results are very sensitive. Second, we considered all major changes and,
in contrast to the other three assumptions, did not concentrate on election years. When
only election years are analyzed, the number of major changes reduces to 8. Average debt
growth then is 4.3 per cent, which is clearly below the overall average. No evidence for
Assumption 4 remains. There is, however, still a pattern. If the CDU is thrown out of
office in an election year, debt growth is 5.9 per cent (5 cases) and 1.7 per cent for the
SPD (3 cases). The lower value of the SPD can also be found in the regressions: the
coefficient for ASSUMP4*SPD is negative, while the one for ASSUMP4*CDU is positive.
23
7 Conclusion
We analyzed the political determinants of the West German La¨nder deficits from 1960 to
2000. Since political institutions and electoral rules are identical across German states,
our study does not suffer from the fundamental problem of disentangling the effects of
political variables from the impact of political institutions that typically arises when
comparing jurisdictions.
Overall we tested five hypotheses taken from the broad theoretical literature on the
political economy of public expenditures and/or public debt issue. We found no evidence
for public debt being higher in election years. Thus, opportunistic behavior, as suggested
by Nordhaus (1975) and MacRae (1977), cannot be found. Rather than buying votes
through higher debt in election years, parties issue significantly less debt in pre-election
years. As suggested by Rogoff and Sibert (1988), parties use low debt in pre-election years
to signal fiscal competence.
While the opportunistic school considers that parties only care about winning the next
election, the partisan school claims that the policies implemented are driven by party
ideology alone (Hibbs (1977)). Partisan theory predicts that left wing parties will issue
more debt since they are more inclined to run redistributive policies. We find no partisan
trends in German states’ fiscal policies. This result holds for a left/right-scale as well as
for more flexible specifications, like dummies for all different party constellations. The
Social Democrats, for example, do not issue significantly more debt than the Christian
Democrats.
Coalition governments may arise in proportional electoral systems. There may thus
be another stage of conflict once electoral competition is over. This is expected to result
in larger public deficits (Persson and Tabellini (1997) and Alesina and Perotti (1994)).
More than 50 per cent of state governments were (mostly two-party) coalitions. The sign
of the estimated coefficients was found to be in line with these theories, though statistical
significance was not overwhelming.
Among others, Persson and Tabellini (1997) linked the probability of being reelected
to debt issue in election years. The more unlikely a government is to be reelected, the
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smaller is the internalized fraction of costs of further borrowing. We considered four
different approximations of the reelection probability and found no evidence for an impact
of political instability on state public finance. This is not too surprising as German politics
are characterized by reasonable stability. Over all the ten states there were only 11 major
government turnovers within these forty years.
Although we found no partisan effects and no impact of coalition governments, political
parties do use the strategic tools discussed to different degrees: the opportunistic behavior
of the Rogoff/Sibert type suggested lower deficits in pre-election years in order to signal
fiscal competence. We found that CDU single-party governments use this strategy more
aggressively than any other government constellation. This may explain why the CDU is
typically considered more competent in fiscal policy even though no partisan effects can
be detected.
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DEFICIT debt growth rate
DEFICIT(-1) lagged debt growth rate
GDP real growth rate of gross domestic product
INTRATE real interest rate
UNIFIC unification dummy, equals 1 from 1991 on
EQUAL equalization scheme dummy, 1 from 1995 on
OIL1 first oil crisis dummy, 1 for 1974 and 1975
OIL2 second oil crisis dummy, 1 for 1978 to 1981
ELECTION = 1 in election years
PREELEC = 1 in pre-election years
LEFT = 1 for SPD dominated governments
RIGHT = 1 for CDU dominated governments
SPD = 1 for single-party Social Democratic governments
CDU = 1 for single-party Christian Democratic governments
SPDFDP = 1 for SPD coalitions with Liberals
SPDGREEN = 1 for SPD coalitions with Greens
SPDCDU = 1 for SPD and CDU coalitions
CDUFDP = 1 for CDU coalitions with Liberals
ELSE = 1 for remaining government constellations
COAL = 1 for coalition governments
COALSIZE number of parties in a coalition
ASSUMP1 current government majority in election year
ASSUMP2 current government votes in upcoming elections in elelction year
ASSUMP3 difference in votes in upcoming elections of opposition block and
incumbent block in election year
ASSUMP4 change from CDU to SPD government or vice versa
Table 1: Explanation of variables.
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Variable N mean s.d. min max
DEFICIT 409 .0648 .1143 -.1760 1.1946
GDP 409 .0318 .0330 -.0770 .1383
INTRATE 410 4.4649 1.5982 2.5000 8.2100
DEFICIT*ELECTION 100 .0727 .1159 -.0982 .8687
DEFICIT*PREELEC 102 .0465 .0941 -.1760 .3536
DEFICIT*PREELEC*SPD 23 .0406 .0676 -.0731 .2482
DEFICIT*PREELEC*SPDFDP 17 .0351 .0947 -.1049 .2222
DEFICIT*PREELEC*SPDGREEN 8 .0301 .0361 -.0424 .0662
DEFICIT*PREELEC*SPDCDU 6 .0799 .1082 -.0283 .2439
DEFICIT*PREELEC*CDU 27 .0573 .0746 -.0723 .3382
DEFICIT*PREELEC*CDUFDP 18 .0383 .1459 -.1760 .3536
DEFICIT*PREELEC*ELSE 3 .0848 .1656 -.0657 .2623
LEFT 410 .5268 .4999 0 1
RIGHT 410 .4732 .4999 0 1
SPD 410 .2244 .4177 0 1
SPDFDP 410 .1829 .3871 0 1
SPDGREEN 410 .0780 .2686 0 1
SPDCDU 410 .0488 .2157 0 1
CDU 410 .2707 .4449 0 1
CDUFDP 410 .1805 .3851 0 1
ELSE 410 .0244 .1544 0 1
DEFICIT*LEFT 216 .0623 .1030 -.1319 .8687
DEFICIT*RIGHT 193 .0671 .1261 -.1760 1.1946
DEFICIT*SPD 92 .0646 .0751 -.0731 .2887
DEFICIT*SPDFDP 71 .0801 .1413 -.1212 .8687
DEFICIT*SPDGREEN 32 .0293 .0245 -.0423 .0787
DEFICIT*SPDCDU 20 .0501 .1080 -.0572 .3527
DEFICIT*CDU 111 .0680 .0821 -.0982 .3927
DEFICIT*CDUFDP 73 .0690 .1766 -.1760 1.1946
DEFICIT*ELSE 10 .0355 .1184 -.1319 .2623
COAL 410 .5049 .5006 0 1
COALSIZE 410 1.5366 .5593 1 3
DEFICIT*COAL 206 .0632 .1411 -.1760 1.1946
ASSUMP1 99 53.8030 7.6443 41.7000 84.8000
ASSUMP1† 93 52.3376 4.7765 41.7000 67.0000
ASSUMP2 99 52.7423 9.5092 33.3000 92.0000
ASSUMP2† 93 50.9172 5.9199 33.3000 67.0000
ASSUMP3 101 -10.4109 11.0157 -37.3000 24.4000
ASSUMP3† 95 -10.5316 11.2293 -37.3000 24.4000
ASSUMP4 410 .0268 .1618 0 1
ASSUMP4‡ 410 .0195 .1385 0 1
DEFICIT*ASSUMP4 11 .0806 .0960 -.0113 .2888
DEFICIT*ASSUMP4‡ 8 .0431 .0452 -.0113 .1153
DEFICIT*ASSUMP4*SPD 5 .0607 .0974 -.0113 .2242
DEFICIT*ASSUMP4*SPD‡ 3 .0166 .0468 -.0113 .0706
DEFICIT*ASSUMP4*CDU 6 .0973 .1006 .0237 .2888
DEFICIT*ASSUMP4*CDU‡ 5 .0589 .0405 .0237 .1153
Table 2: Descriptive statistics. Notes: †without SPD/CDU coalitions, ‡major government
changes for election years only
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Variable OLS LSDV GMM
DEFICIT(-1) .3212∗∗∗ (.0436) .3068∗∗∗ (.0444) .2914∗∗∗ (.0421)
GDP -.6503∗∗∗ (.1744) -.6322∗∗∗ (.1788) -.5702∗∗∗ (.1671)
INTRATE -.0078∗∗ (.0038) -.0079∗∗ (.0039) -.0080∗∗ (.0035)
OIL1 .1444∗∗∗ (.0240) .1450∗∗∗ (.0241) .1409∗∗∗ (.0218)
OIL2 .0177 (.0175) .0182 (.0176) .0271∗ (.0161)
UNIFIC -.0333∗ (.0194) -.0335∗ (.0195) -.0059 (.0195)
EQUAL -.0525 (.0240) -.0257 (.0241) -.0080 (.0230)
CONSTANT .1039∗∗∗ (.0203) .1049∗∗∗ (.0204) -.0024∗∗∗ (.0008)
ELECTION .0080 (.0111) .0085 (.0112) .0150 (.0100)
PREELEC -.0222∗∗ (.0110) -.0216∗ (.0111) -.0154 (.0100)
PREELEC*SPD -.0244 (.0208) -.0244 (.0214) -.0220 (.0202)
PREELEC*SPDFDP -.0300 (.0246) -.0284 (.0253) -.0375 (.0241)
PREELEC*SPDGREEN -.0011 (.0348) -.0006 (.0355) .0026 (.0337)
PREELEC*SPDCDU .0219 (.0393) .0277 (.0404) .0426 (.0397)
PREELEC*CDU -.0404∗∗ (.0193) -.0363∗ (.0202) -.0302 (.0191)
PREELEC*CDUFDP -.0228 (.0234) -.0288 (.0239) -.0025 (.0232)
PREELEC*ELSE .0513 (.0554) .0536 (.0567) .0420 (.0580)
LEFT .0071 (.0099) .0121 (.0157) .0159 (.0280)
SPD .0087 (.0139) .0147 (.0194) -.0073 (.0332)
SPDFDP .0187 (.0148) .0299 (.0206) -.0031 (.0357)
SPDGREEN .0228 (.0220) .0349 (.0282) .0230 (.0399)
SPDCDU .0185 (.0239) .0273 (.0271) .0189 (.0376)
CDUFDP .0209 (.0151) .0163 (.0172) -.0112 (.0248)
ELSE .0404 (.0337) .0593 (.0397) .0500 (.0590)
COAL .0169∗ (.0099) .0163 (.0109) .0057 (.0165)
COALSIZE .0077 (.0091) .0061 (.0098) -.0029 (.0148)
ASSUMP4 .0303 (.0292) .0226 (.0298) .0532∗ (.0289)
ASSUMP4*SPD -.0035 (.0431) -.0120 (.0438) .0380 (.0444)
ASSUMP4*CDU .0584 (.0394) .0511 (.0398) .0637∗ (.0376)
Table 3: Regression results, dependent variable DEFICIT. Notes: a horizontal line indi-
cates a new regression. All regressions include the variables of the first regression. To
save space, coefficients are not reported.
Significance levels: *** = 0.01, ** = 0.05, * = 0.10, standard errors in brackets.
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